Saudi Arabia to Bahrain causeway reopens from July 23
Saudi Arabia to Bahrain causeway reopens from July 23
COVID-19: Bahrain sets entry rules for reopened King Fahd
COVID-19: Should Saudi-Bahrain Causeway be Closed?
Coronavirus: Bahrain reopens King Fahd Causeway for
Bahrain: King Fahad Causeway Reopening Rumours Denied
Saudi Arabia to Bahrain causeway reopens today
The King Fahd Causeway Will Gradually Reopen From Today
is bahrain causeway open now
is bahrain causeway open now - win
[Secret] Bahrain Blues Part 3: Finale
[M] I'm not actually doing anything here, I just thought this would be good to show what has happened, and showing if a modevent or something else is needed once this is all over [/M] With all of our assets in place, the cyberattacking having been executed, and the militias armed, the time has come for regime change in Bahrain. By now, the people of the country will be out on the streets enmasse, protesting against the regime, ideally on a scale similar to 2011. With the government in a certain crisis because of the results of the cyberattack, we will give the militias the order to go, and begin the campaign against the government. For their opening attack, we will recommend the King Faud Causeway as the target. This will make transporting GCC troops into Bahrain very difficult, along with essentially cutting off the island to the outside world for some time. Using the rockets and heavy weaponry we provided, they should be able to easily manage to cause major structural damage to the bridge, perhaps even destroying it in some parts. Our deeply embedded Quds Force operatives will then be activated into service, and will be given orders to provoke the Shia protestors into overthrowing the government, somehow. This can be through the “government” shooting into the crowd, making false statements on behalf of the Bahraini government, or just causing chaos in general. We cannot make it look like we were the ones to overthrow the government, it has to be the Bahraini people. At the end of all of this, Allah willing, the Shia people in Bahrain will no longer have to live under the boot of the Sunnis.
June 1971 Several months after the proposal for a causeway between Bahrain and Qatar was originally announced, the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure has now presented the results of its planning for the project — which has also received an official name, Jisr al-Wahda (جسر الوحدة), meaning Unity Bridge or Unity Causeway — thus far. Initial surveys have found a promising route between Bahrain and Qatar, which is the shortest and most viable location for a causeway. The water in this area is all less than 10 meters deep, and the suggested path includes several islands and shoals poking above the water. It has two main parts:
A 20 km stretch from the southern coast of Bahrain Island to the northern tip of the Hawar Islands, passing over Mashtan Island and Al Muturith Island on the way; this part is mostly over water and will be the actual bridge part. It will be realised as a viaduct with small arches and a low clearance (with a "bump" to allow some larger ships to pass through).
An 18 km stretch curved across the Hawar Islands to Ras Abrouq on the Zekreet Peninsula (Qatari mainland north of of Dukhan); most of this is on solid ground with four gaps between the islands of 1–2 km each. These gaps will be crossed by a mix of bridges and embankments.
Both ends will be connected to the existing road networks in Bahrain and Qatar. The causeway will carry a motorway with two lanes of traffic in each direction. The government has chosen Dutch company Ballast Nedam as main contractor for the project. The Dutch have the most experience of any nation when it comes to building structures in the sea, and Ballast Nedam specifically has already built the Afsluitdijk (a 32 km long dam/causeway) and the Zeeland Bridge (Europe's longest bridge) [M: and also built the OTL King Fahd Causeway between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia]. American engineers who have worked on the Lake Pontchartrain Causeway will also be consulted. There are a few more obstacles to overcome before starting work on the causeway in earnest: For one, further surveying and exploration will be necessary to confirm the viability of the suggested route. Additionally, the Hawar Islands are still disputed between Bahrain and Qatar and a disagreement between the two could hamper construction. That's why the two emirates will have their long-standing territorial disputes adjudicated by the Union Supreme Court, which will hopefully hear the case soon. These concerns will likely be dealt with by early 1972, at which point construction will take another five to six years. The opening of the Jisr al-Wahda has been tentatively planned for late 1977. The project is estimated to cost up to $1 billion, which will be financed by the emirates of Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, and Qatar in addition to the union budget. Funding will also be sought from the World Bank. The motorway will be made a toll road to pay for maintenance and recover the construction costs in the long term. Milestone: "Build a Sustainable National Road System" (2/5)
January 2029 Due to the ready availability of cheap hydrocarbon resources like oil and natural gas, the Arab Gulf States have struggled to develop local sources of energy with low greenhouse gas emissions. Several nuclear power projects have been considered on the peninsula in the past, but up until the completion of the Barakh Nuclear Power Plant in the UAE in 2020, none had ever materialized. With the success of Barakah and the UAE’s decision to open up two new nuclear power plants, the other Arab Gulf States are starting to reconsider nuclear energy as a low-emissions energy source for the future. Oman Oman previously explored building a nuclear power plant in the late 2000s, leading them to sign a memorandum of understanding with Rosatom in 2009. However, upon further investigation, Oman discovered that most of its energy usage was peak load (rather than base load), making nuclear energy a bad fit for power generation. Still, Oman never fully ruled out investments into nuclear energy. In 2017, Oman’s sovereign wealth fund invested 120m USD into a Spanish uranium mining venture, leading some to believe that they were looking to secure fuel sources for future nuclear ambitions. As Oman has continued to develop and grow, the possibility of purchasing nuclear reactors has come up once again. The country’s recent industrial development, fueled by free trade zones in Duqm and Salalah in the south, has increased its base load demand, making nuclear energy more attractive than it was almost twenty years ago. Oman has reached back out to Russia to discuss the construction of four reactor nuclear power plant near Filim, about 120km northwest of Duqm. This plant would use two VVER-TOI reactors to generate roughly 2,400MW of electricity, or somewhere around half of Oman’s total annual electricity consumption. The price tag is expected to be around 13.5b USD, with the first core achieving criticality in 2034 and the second in 2036. Necessary training will be provided by Rosatom at reactors in Russia and by the UAE at Barakah. In order to help boost the viability of the project, Oman has announced that it will also be creating a joint energy distribution system with the UAE, which will allow the two countries to buy and sell electricity back and forth with each other. Given the UAE’s major new pushes to move its energy production away from oil and natural gas, the UAE is expected to purchase a considerable amount of the plant’s electricity generation. Qatar Qatar considered building its own nuclear power plant in the late 2000s, signing an MoU with Rosatom in 2010, but struggled to find an adequate reactor for its needs. As one of the smallest Arab Gulf States in terms of population (rivaled only by Bahrain), the 1000MW plus reactors that were popular in the late 2000s were simply too big for Qatar’s needs, and the lack of a modern reactor in the 300-600MW range meant that Qatar decided that nuclear energy was a poor fit for its power generation needs at the time. Since then, Qatar’s population has grown considerably, as has its energy consumption. The new land border between Qatar and the UAE as well as the construction of the Bahrain-Qatar Causeway provide additional opportunities for energy export that make nuclear energy considerably more viable an option than in the late 2000s--especially as part of a broader framework of regional cooperation With this in mind, Qatar has elected to move forward with the construction of a new four core nuclear power plant within its borders. Built on the western coast of the peninsula (that is, the part closer to Bahrain) near Freiha, a few dozen kilometers north of the Qatar-Bahrain Causeway, the new power plant will use four APR+ reactors from KEPCO, with a net capacity of 6020MW, will cost 22b USD, with the first core achieving criticality in 2034 and the last in 2037. Training will be provided by KEPCO and the UAE at Barakah. On its own, this new power plant is able to provide over 100 percent of Qatar’s electricity needs. Since this is generally considered a bad idea, in practice, Qatar has entered into a partnership with neighboring Bahrain (which isn’t exactly the best place to build a nuclear reactor right now, given its instability) to fund, build, and operate the power plant. More details on that arrangement below. Bahrain As the smallest and poorest of the Arab Gulf States, Bahrain has never publicly considered building a nuclear power plant, though it did partake in a joint nuclear viability study with the other GCC states in the late 2000s. Bahrain faced many of the same issues as Qatar with regards to nuclear power, with a population that is too small to justify the larger reactors that are now popular without some sort of larger regional cooperation. Suffice to say, Bahrain is not the best place to be building a nuclear reactor right now. A little more than a year past an armed insurgency that managed to seize territory and kill the King, not many people in Bahrain’s government are enthusiastic about the prospect of building a nuclear power plant for terrorists to focus their attention against. Enter Qatar. Plagued by similar issues of small population (and correspondingly low energy consumption), Qatar has struggled to build justification to build a nuclear power plant for the last two decades. But, if the energy markets of Qatar and Bahrain were to be combined, then a nuclear power plant looks much more viable. Bahrain’s government has agreed to cooperate with Qatar on the joint funding, construction, and operation of the new power plant at Freiha. The generation capacity will be split between them, with two undersea cables following the Qatar-Bahrain Causeway transferring the electricity. In total, this will enable the plant to provide about half of the joint electricity consumption of Bahrain and Qatar. Electricity transmission cables will also be built to the UAE through Qatar to open up the Emirates as an energy export/import market. Kuwait Kuwait has attempted to develop a civilian nuclear program twice in the past. The first attempt in the 1970s, which was supported by the United Kingdom, sought to build a 50MW test reactor, but fell through following the Three Mile Island accident in the 1980s. Later, in 2009, with oil prices rising and energy demand rapidly expanding as the country grew, Kuwait once against sought to build a nuclear reactor, drafting international agreements with France, the United States, Japan, and Jordan to build the capacity necessary to operate a plant. Again, these plans were canceled following a nuclear disaster--this time, the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Now, twenty years later and with a new generation of leadership in charge, Kuwait is once again examining nuclear energy as an option for meeting its rapidly growing energy needs. After examining the available options, Kuwait is hoping to contract the construction of a four-core nuclear power plant using General Electric Hitachi Nuclear Energy’s Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor. The ESBWR is considered to be the world’s safest reactor due to its passively safe design and its ability to remain in a safe, stable condition for 72 hours without operator input or power. This safety is important to Kuwait, and have helped to alleviate many of the concerns surrounding the project. At a cost of roughly 28b, this project will have the ability to meet half of Kuwait’s electricity demand. The first core is set to achieve criticality in 2034, and the final core in 2037. Training will be provided at North Anna Nuclear Generating Station in Virginia.
Attacks on CIRAP After significant deliberation and debate within the Council of Ministers. Enough pressure has been put on King Mutaib. He has agreed to transfer command of 6 brigades of National Guard troops over to regular Saudi Arabian Army command. Along with that 8 battalions of militia soldiers maintained by the Saudi Arabian National Guard have been ordered to report to the Eastern command, where they will join those forces in an assault on Damman. The National Guard and the militias on retainer have been held in reserve around Riyadh to defend King Mutaib and prevent any coup d’etat against him from taking place. They have seen little to no combat in the Civil War, but now with these troops being given over to the regular Army command it may be enough to tip the scales. The next step of the Saudi Civil War relies largely on wiping out CIRAP by taking the major cities of Medina and Mecca. King Mutaib, but more importantly Chairman of the General Staff al-Farqah have courted religious leaders, and have received religious blessing to undertake violence to retake the cities. Though other religious leaders supporting CIRAP have decried such blessings. By and large though the popular support for CIRAP has faded over time, and if the cities fall and the Hejaz population can be kept placated the traitors will collapse rapidly into disorganized bands. The 1st Army will be formed from Army and National Guard units and will work to encircle and then capture Medina and Mecca for the Kingdom. A secondary objective will be the capture of Jeddah so that the Navy can be returned from foreign ports. The 1st Army will include The 4th Armored Brigade: 45 M1A2S Abrams The 8th Armored Brigade: 45 M1A2S Abrams The 11th Mechanized Brigade: 100 M2 Bradleys The 14th Mechanized Brigade: 100 M2 Bradleys The 16th Infantry Brigade: 4,000 troops The 17th Infantry Brigade: 4,000 troops The 18th Infantry Brigade: 4,000 troops The 1st National Guard Infantry Brigade: 2,500 troops The 3rd National Guard Infantry Brigade: 2,500 troops The 1st Army will be led by the Armored Brigades who will respectively encircle the cities of Medina and Mecca, supported by the Mechanized Brigades, and the National Guard infantry brigades. Once the cities are encircled the Infantry brigades will assault the cities in LAV-25s and Humvees. CIRAP forces will be light within the cities, and popular support has dried up. The less than 20k troops that make up CIRAP will be hard pressed to get reinforcements into the city. While the assault on the cities begins, the Egyptian forces will be asked to join in on attacks from the north and coastline to distract the CIRAP forces, and perhaps retake Jeddah when they are weakened. Due to supply line constraints, Egypt has been forced to scale down its deployments in Western Saudi Arabia, leaving only the Republican Guard in the AO. The previously deployed Armor division will redeploy back to Egypt by way of Aqaba, while the mechanized division has been redeployed to the northern border to provide assistance against ISIS. Egypt will deploy the following assets to support Saudi operations:
Name
Number
Egyptian Republican Guard
24,000
T-14
656
T-15
778
2S35 Koalitsiya-SV
216
Buk-M3
6
BM-21
36
Egyptian Marines
3,000
Rames II
44
BTR-80
444
MANPADs and ATGMs
Large amounts
RSF
20,000
Trucktm
1,500
BMPT Terminator
30
UH-60
22
MI-28
30
F-16E
90
MIG-29M
90
CH-7
45
F-117X
15(used only on extremely high value targets with heavy jamming support)
E-2D
2
MIG LMFS
30(Air superiority and moderately high value targets with moderate jamming support)
J-11D
30(Providing Jamming escorts)
KC-46
30(Providing Tanker support over the red sea)
Wingloong I/II
102(Providing Recon and targeting support over the operational area)
Attacks on the PDF The 2nd Army will be formed outside of Damman. Made up of primarily the 16k militia men of the Sunni groups within the National Guard, they will begin to engage the PDF across the nominal border they have established around Damman. The United Arab Emirates will be asked to coordinate with the ships of the Royal Saudi Navy to enforce a blockade of Damman. Regular Saudi troops from the: 6th Armored Brigade: 45 M1A2S Abrams 9th Mechanized Brigade: 120 M2 Bradleys 15th Infantry Brigade: 4,000 troops 1st Airborne Brigade: 3,200 troops Will begin an attack on Damman once the militia men have established a toehold against the PDF. While Chinese armed, these groups cannot stand up to the might of regular troops and militia, along with foreign support. The Air War The crux of these new offensives is that the Royal Saudi Air Force will begin an increased level of operations. They will support all military units by performing coordinated strikes against the rebels in CIRAP and the PDF to destroy any major equipment or weapons systems and then destroy supply caches, and strike against leadership locations. The United States will be asked to assist in this plan, by helping coordinate missions and flights, as their experience in these matters are invaluable to the Royal Saudi Air Force. The War Against ISIS Throughout this conflict, ISIS has proven to be a persistent pain in the ass, harassing our supply lines and even managing to hold some territory along the Saudi-Iraqi border. This level of ISIS activity has managed to earn the ire of Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, which has agreed to resume anti-ISIS air strikes along the northern Saudi border. The Jordanian forces previously used to assist in anti-CIRAP operations in the West will instead redeploy north to help guarantee the security of the Jordan-Saudi Arabia-Iraq border. Egypt will also contribute one of its mechanized divisions to this purpose, filling the space left by Emirati forces, which have been forced to redeploy to Bahrain in response to ongoing instability there. With a whole lot of new firepower up by the border, it should be pretty easy to push ISIS out and keep them from crossing over the border again. We hope. Anti-ISIS Equipment Deployment
Phase One Commander’s Intent: Solidify control over government territory in Bahrain to prevent further deterioration of the situation. Thanks to leads from British intelligence, it is clear that China, and possibly Iran, has been providing materiel to dissidents in Bahrain. And if there was somehow any doubt remaining as to who their sponsor was, China was kind enough to dispel all doubts when they decided to move to full, open, overt support of the rebels in Bahrain. If we are to have any hope of stabilizing the situation in the country and preventing a further collapse of the government, this supply of arms must be cut off. The newly-minted King of Bahrain, Salman bin Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, will immediately utilize his authority to declare martial law throughout the country, as well as a blanket ban on people entering or exiting the country without advance permission from the government. Every port in the country will be directed to turn away all vessels unless they have the proper authorization--which will be restricted, more or less, to ships carrying essentials. Aircraft will not be permitted to land at Bahrain International Airport (which is under the control of the rebels anyway, so it’s not exactly fully functional at the moment). Any aircraft attempting to do so will be intercepted and escorted out of Bahrain’s airspace. Failure to comply will result in the aircraft being shot down. Coupled with these bans, King Salman will also declare a temporary suspension on recreational and commercial shipping activities, claiming that the policies are intended to “allow fisheries in the Arab Gulf, which are threatened by climate change and overfishing, a chance to recover.” [S] In reality, these bans are intended to create a pretext for GCC forces to intercept and search any and all small craft within Bahrain’s waters--which is important, as China has primarily been using small craft like fishing boats and rubber inflatables to smuggle materiel into Bahrain. [/S] King Fahd Causeway, the bridge connecting Bahrain to Saudi Arabia, will be closed to public traffic until further notice, except for the passage of foodstuffs, essential goods, authorized personnel, and military traffic, (the first three having to go through a rigorous search process on Passport Island or on Umm an Nasan. In practice, we don’t expect the bridge to see much usage due to PDF activity at the other end in Dammam--this is more or less to make sure they don’t try to smuggle anything across the bridge or storm the island. The Bahraini edge of the bridge will be heavily fortified to prevent PDF forces from trying to force a crossing or, more realistically, to prevent protesters or militias from seizing control of the Bahraini end of the bridge. With the militia’s seizure of territory on the island of Muharraq, we believe that the terrorists have concentrated most of their materiel--or at least a significant portion of it--on that island. In other words, if we can cut off their ability to move from that island into the rest of the country, we can severely restrict their ability to operate on the main island. To this end, Bahrain and the GCC will be heavily fortifying the bridgeheads on Bahrain Island. No passage will be permitted by anything other than military vehicles. The one exception to this policy will be at Shaikh Hamad Causeway, which will be open to pedestrians and government-run busses only. People attempting to cross the bridge must first submit themselves to searches by security forces on the government-controlled portion of Muharraq Island surrounding the bridgehead. The government controlled territory on Muharraq Island will be heavily fortified. The southern portion, where government forces have retained control of the main port of Bahrain, lends itself well to these sorts of defensive fortifications, with Prince Khalifah bin Salman Causeway more or less dividing the government and rebel territory, with an expanse of open terrain on the southern (government) side of the Causeway. This territory will more or less be used as a killzone against any militia offensives trying to push south and seize the port. The bridgehead around Shaikh Hamad Causeway is much more urban, making it harder to set up the sort of open ground killzone we would want for defense. Still, we will make due with what we have: security forces, reinforced across the Causeway, will set up a defensive perimeter bounded by Airport Avenue on the North, Muharraq Al-Khubra Garden to the north/northeast, and Khalifa Al Khabeer Highway on the East. The civilian buildings on this border will be forcibly vacated. Phase Two Commander’s Intent: Seize control of Bahrain International Airport in preparation of further offensive operations. With the situation on the island stabilized, next comes the task of retaking territory. Fortunately for us, OPFOR is a motley band of untrained militias (China has armed the militias, but never trained them. After all, where would they even train a militia on an island as small as Bahrain that the government wouldn’t notice?). We do not expect them to be able to hold ground against any sort of coordinated offense. Unfortunately for us, Muharraq Island is fairly urban and densely populated. While it lacks the skyscrapers of Bahrain Island, this will still be urban combat, and casualty numbers will likely represent that. Fortunately again, we have been dealt a massive advantage by the ethnography of Muharraq Island. Though Bahrain is majority Shi’a, Muharraq Island is actually majority Sunni--especially in the communities to the south of the airport, where most neighborhoods are either exclusively or majority Sunni. Since OPFOR is a group of Shi’a Islamist militias looking to overthrow the Sunni government and install a Shi’a Islamic Republic, we don’t expect the locals to be too sympathetic to their cause. As such, we expect OPFOR to have a hard time organizing an effective asymmetric resistance (which usually relies heavily on local support for things like arms caches, supplies, etcetera). The primary target of this phase of offensive operations is to secure Bahrain International Airport. The Airport is strategically situated between the three major OPFOR-controlled neighborhoods. Taking control of the Airport will, in essence, divide these OPFOR strongholds, preventing them from reinforcing one another and allowing us to deal with them one by one. Prior to our offensive against the airport, the forces currently located near Khalifa Bin Salman Port (with reinforcements shipped in using the port) will being a series of probing attacks against OPFOR forces in the Al Hidd neighborhood in southern Muharraq. These offensives are mostly to divert attention from the operations that are to come, but we’ll certainly take and hold territory here if we can get it. After a day or so of operations in Al Hidd, we will launch a coordinated nighttime assault on Bahrain International Airport. Using Khalifa Al Khabeer Highway, Airport Road, and Avenue 20, we will launch a multi-pronged attack on the Airport, seeking to use our superior mobility (we have armored vehicles, they do not) to take over the vast, open expanses of the airport grounds. At the same time our ground assault is occuring, the United States 1st Ranger Battalion will launch an airfield seizure on Bahrain International Airport. About two hundred Rangers, departing from an American air base in the UAE, will paradrop onto the 4km2 airport grounds in the dead of the night, securing the airport until advancing BLUFOR units can relieve them. Between the mobility advantage enjoyed by BLUFOR troops, the low quality of OPFOR units, and the element of surprise, we expect to have taken control of the airport and its environs before the sun rises. The Rangers will then pull out of the area--either by riding in BLUFOR transports to the US Naval Base on Bahrain Island or through airlift out of the airport--whichever we think is safer. Phase 3 Commander’s Intent: Eliminate all armed opposition on Muharraq Island. With the airport taken, OPFOR will be divided, making it significantly easier to handle through a series of coordinated pushes. The first offensives will focus on taking control of the territory south of the airport (coming both south from the airport grounds and north from Khalifa bin Salman Port) and west of the airport (using both the airport and the Shaikh Hamad Causeway bridgehead as a base of attack). Since most neighborhoods in these areas are Sunni-majority or Sunni-exclusive, we expect the locals to be pretty forthcoming about the presence of enemy weapons caches, safehouses, strongholds, firing positions, etc. All in all, these shouldn’t pose too much of a problem to us. Once the neighborhoods south and west of the airport are secured, BLUFOR units will push north to secure the neighborhoods to the north of the airport. These neighborhoods are a little more a mix--some are Shi’a, some are Sunni--so local support might be a little more tepid. Either way, we’ll lean on the Sunni communities here to help us in crushing OPFOR’s ability to wage an asymmetric insurgency. The Air War Commander’s Intent: Maintain air superiority and utilize it to support BLUFOR ground assaults. We’ll admit: the rebels took us somewhat by surprise when they managed to accurately and effectively guide artillery onto the royal residence in Bahrain, killing the King. We’re not sure how they managed to smuggle those artillery pieces onto the island without us noticing, nor where they learned to use them (and to use them accurately) without us hearing about it, but the long and short of things is that they have artillery and they know how to use it. But now that we know they have it, they will not get to use it again. Bahrain isn’t exactly big. Bahrain Island is only ~300km2 (and is heavily urban for most of that expanse, so there’s even fewer areas where it would be feasible to set up artillery) while Muharraq Island (where the rebels are most heavily concentrated) is only ~50km2, so the country should be pretty easy to keep under constant aerial surveillance of some form or another. Clocking in at 3,210kg and measuring a whopping 5.4 meters when in transport configuration, it should be pretty damn easy to spot these things and blow them to hell using either drones or attack helicopters before they get a chance to shoot again.
Name
Type
Number
Contributing Nation
Regular Army Soldiers
Regular Soldiers
7000
United Arab Emirates
Presidential Guard Soldiers
Special Forces
1000
United Arab Emirates
Leclerc Tropic
MBT
80
United Arab Emirates
BMP-3
IFV
300
United Arab Emirates
UH-60L Black Hawk
Transport Helo
15
Rabdan 8x8
APC (Wheeled)
200
United Arab Emirates
Nimr
MRAP
200
United Arab Emirates
F-16V
Multirole
8
United Arab Emirates
Mirage 2000EAD
Multirole
12
United Arab Emirates
Airbus 330 MRTT
Tanker
2
United Arab Emirates
AH-64E
Attack Helicopter
12
United Arab Emirates
Yabhon United 40
UCAV
20
United Arab Emirates
Whatever
Bahrain
Sends
Us
US Army Rangers
Special Forces
200
United States
C-130 Hercules
Transport (Paradrop)
4
United States
Outside of Muharraq Island
We’re still planning on continuing all of the other things we’re doing to help stabilize Bahrain. Now that it has become readily apparent that the terrorists are getting support from China, we expect our earlier efforts to paint the terrorists as a Chinese-backed Fifth Column to be significantly more successful. After all, we were right all along! China will become a convenient (and completely accurate) scapegoat for everything going bad in Bahrain--from the death of the King to the open warfare on the streets. While the King dying is obviously bad for business, it is a small blessing in that it justifies increased efforts to crack down on the unrest in the country. Moreover, the fact that you’re now liable to get caught in the crossfire between military forces and literal terrorists if you go to any given protest should help to keep the less enthusiastic members of the Opposition off of the streets and in their homes. We will continue our efforts to prevent information from getting out of Bahrain--jammers, shutting down the internet in “problem neighborhoods”, etc. [S] GCC intelligence will launch a coordinated multimedia campaign to cast the armed militants that killed the King as a violent extremist group that is damaging the cause of the peaceful, nonviolent protesters. The campaign will highlight how bad things are in the rebel-controlled areas, as well as just about any domestic opposition to the rebels we can find. Any division we can make in the enemy ranks is good for us. We’ll ask for help from the CIA in doing this. [/S]
Name
Type
Number
Contributing Nation
Kuwaiti Police
Riot Police w/ Transports
400
Kuwait
Jordanian Police
Riot Police w/ Transports
400
Jordan
Omani Police
Riot Police w/ Transports
300
Oman
Dubai Police
Riot Police
600
Dubai
Abu Dhabi Police
Riot Police
500
Abu Dhabi
Sharjah Police
Riot Police
400
Sharjah
Nimr
MRAP
500
United Arab Emirates
Mirage 2000-RAD
Reconnaissance Aircraft
2
United Arab Emirates
Global 6000 “Project Dolphin”
SIGINT/Surveillance
1
United Arab Emirates
ECH-130H Compass Call Baseline-2
Electronic Warfare
1
United Arab Emirates
Presidential Guard Soldiers
Special Forces/Counterterrorism
1000
United Arab Emirates
Regular Army Soldiers
Regular Soldiers
4000
United Arab Emirates
UH-60L Black Hawk
Transport Helicopter
8
United Arab Emirates
BTR-3U Guardian
APC (Wheeled)
20
United Arab Emirates
EE-11 Urutu
APC (Wheeled)
20
United Arab Emirates
Leclerc Tropic
MBT
40
United Arab Emirates
Rabdan 8x8
APC
80
United Arab Emirates
Whatever
Bahrain
Gives
Us
Responding to China
China’s threat to institute a no fly zone must be responded to--not just because it is an unacceptable violation of the territorial sovereignty of Bahrain, but because it impedes our ability to adequately respond to the ongoing crisis in the country. We have no intention of abiding by the Chinese NFZ. With their base in Qatar removed, any NFZ maintenance operations will have to be run out of China’s bases in Pakistan. Whether they use their base in Peshawar or Gwadar, any flight path will take them directly past the UAE, where surface-based radars and anti-air installations should pick them up well in advance of their arrival in Bahrain. As we (or Oman) detect these aircraft, we will forward the relevant information to Bahrain and scramble F-16s to intercept (with the number being based off of how many planes are in China’s formation--the goal is to have at least equal numbers of F-16s responding to any Chinese sortie, backed up by F-35s discussed below). These aircraft will shadow the Chinese aircraft from a safe distance, informing the Chinese aircraft that, should they violate Bahraini airspace or otherwise attack any GCC member, they will be shot down. While the F-16s are doing the actual visible intercepting, F-35s will be kept at a safe distance behind the Chinese sortie, using their stealth capabilities to avoid detection. If the Chinese aircraft take any sort of aggressive action against any of our allies, the F-35s will be ordered to engage and eliminate all Chinese resistance. If China listens to the intercepting aircraft, they should never even know the F-35s are there. We’re aiming for a force presence of about one F-35 for every two Chinese aircraft in the sortie--so combined with the F-16s, a response of about 1.5 UAE aircraft to one Chinese aircraft. The Emirati air defense network will be put on high alert for the near future, given the threat of an aerial engagement against China near the territory of the UAE. If any of these interceptions erupt into combat, UAE ground-based SAMs will ensure that no Chinese aircraft live to tell the tale, engaging the Chinese aircraft on their return flight. If the Chinese do not engage, neither will we.
Name
Type
Number
Contributing Nation
F-16E Block 60 “Desert Eagle”
Multirole
Up to 32
United Arab Emirates
F-35A “Lightning II”
5th Gen Multirole
Up to 32
United Arab Emirates
ECH-130H Compass Call Baseline-2
Electronic Warfare
1
United Arab Emirates
Global 6000 “Globaleye”
AEW&C
1
United Arab Emirates
Airbus A330 MRTT
Tanker
1
United Arab Emirates
THAAD
ABM
10 Batteries
United Arab Emirates
MEADS
Modern SAM
18 Batteries
United Arab Emirates
MIM-23B I-Hawk
SAM
3 Battalions
United Arab Emirates
MIM-104F
SAM
4 Battalions
United Arab Emirates
Rapier
SHORAD
24 Launchers
United Arab Emirates
Naval Operations
Meanwhile, at sea, BLUFOR naval and coast guard assets will be working double time to enforce the new maritime restrictions imposed by Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, with force contributions from the American Navy and Coast Guard, as well as the Navies and Coast Guards of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Orders will be given to detain anyone found smuggling weapons, including and especially foreign nationals. Now that China is no longer able to stage these smuggling routes out of their base in Qatar, we expect the trips they have to make will be significantly longer, as they will either have to come from Chinese bases in Pakistan (navigating the extremely narrow Strait of Hormuz to do so, where they will likely be detected by Omani or Emirati land-based surveillance installations monitoring strait traffic) or from Iran (which is substantially farther--240km from Bahrain instead of ~40km). This should mean that the smuggling routes China is running will have to use bigger boats and travel farther than they did before, increasing the odds of detection, or at least making it harder for them to accomplish their mission. The ongoing oil embargo against China also means that there are substantially fewer Chinese tankers in the region than there were before, which should make it easier to track those Chinese ships that are in the region--as well as every other ship. Less surface clutter and all that. The smaller ships in the naval deployment, such as the inshore patrol boats, will have the additional task of preventing boat traffic from crossing the strait between Muharraq Island and Bahrain Island. They will be supported in this task by larger ships (using their longer-ranged weapons) and land-based forces on Bahrain Island. Effectively, we’re blockading Muharraq Island and detaining or destroying any ship that tries to enter or leave the small docks scattered across the island without our permission.
The Egyptian nuclear attack submarine force will sortie and establish positions off the continental shelf of Gwadar, upon establishing positions there they will lurk quietly and deep only emerging to signal depth to receive updates on Chinese naval movements from Egyptian military communication satellites. In the event that hostilities between China and the alliance occur, these submarines will be tasked with intercepting any chinese naval formations via combined and coordinated attacks between our bombers(armed with long range hypersonic anti ship missiles) and submarine forces(armed with high speed torpedoes). A26 attack submarines will establish positions outside of Chinese naval bases in the red sea, and will form a screening force at the entrance to the red sea. These submarines will be pre equipped with naval frogmen in the event of the need for their deployment. In the event of hostilities these submarines will torpedo the chinese fleet should they attempt to deploy but if they remain in port they will not be engaged. The Egyptian navy will enter heightened alert with forces being ready to sortie rapidly into the red sea should it be needed.
Egyptian Air Defence Command
While the air defence system is always operational, we will begin dispersing MIG-35s to civil airports and predesigned dual use highways in the event a scramble is needed. MIG-31 interceptors will be put on strip alert and prepared to engage any unauthorized intrusions into Egyptian airspace
Fiddling While Riyadh Burns The warning signs were all there. Protests wracked most every city in the country. Car bombs, shootings, and other attacks were becoming almost daily occurrences. ARAMCO officials screamed about falling profits and the resulting sell-off of state-owned assets. You had to be deaf, blind, and stupid to miss the upheaval in Saudi society. Or, maybe, just as narcissistic as Mohammad bin Salman. In the face of unprecedented conservative resistance to his equally unprecedented program of social reforms and disastrous foreign policy, the Crown Prince doubled down. To the protesters screaming for the removal of American troops from the country--an issue that found support in most corners of the Arab world, he offered only an expansion of American influence in the country, as American special forces launched counter-insurgency operations within the country. To the clerics decrying the rapid secularization of Saudi society and the opening of new heretical houses of worship throughout the country, he offered only new churches and a declaration that the fallen Shi’a of the Hawza in Dammam were martyrs. To the officials of ARAMCO begging for the discounts to be ended, he offered only promises that the discounts would, somehow, fix the crisis (nevermind the fact that the discounts had started the crisis in the first place), all the while laying off foreign workers, who made up most of the company’s labor force. To the members of the House of Saud who called for the release of their kin and the end of the Crown Prince’s “insane” anti-corruption crackdown, he cut their oil stipend entirely. It seemed that there was no constituency that the Crown Prince did not alienate further in his handling of the crisis. To hear the state-controlled media (the only media in the country, really) tell it, everything in the Kingdom was great. Al Arabiya was filled day-in and day-out with footage of “rallies” and “demonstrations” showing their support for the Crown Prince and his reforms, but something about them always seemed… hollow. Inorganic. If you watched often enough, you might start to figure out why. All too often, the same faces appeared at these demonstrations. Ardent supporters, maybe. Or paid actors. The latter seemed more likely if you stepped outside. On every street corner, it seemed there were protesters lambasting the government, with police at best half-heartedly corralling them or, at worst, actively ignoring them. Everyday life in Saudi Arabia had all but ground to a halt. The revolution would not be televised, but that would not stop it. The Grand Mosque Seizure Redux In the early hours of the morning of 29 June 2023 (the middle of Hajj), an alarming series of tweets were published by a collection of previously unremarkable Twitter accounts. The videos attached to the tweet showed a group of armed gunmen--around sixty in the longest of the videos, but there were probably more--storming into the Great Mosque of Mecca in the middle of morning prayers and exchanging fire with the armed guards stationed there. News was scarce in the immediate aftermath, but within twenty minutes, the situation became clearer, though no less awful. As Saudi Arabia awoke, it did so to news that the Great Mosque, the holiest place in all of Islam, had been seized by gunmen. Initial attempts to hold (and then immediately after, to retake) the facility had been thwarted, and the gunmen had taken control of the entire facility, as well as some 10,000 hostages. Saudi police and National Guard immediately surrounded the facility to prevent their escape, beginning the second Grand Mosque Siege. The intelligence reports that filtered in over the coming hours only highlighted the severity of the situation: many of the gunmen identified in the video had ties to the Saudi security establishment, including several members of the Army and the National Guard, while the leader, one Mubarak Saleh, had previously served as a colonel in the National Guard. Their demands, published some 45 minutes after the initial seizure, were extensive. Their laundry list of conservative demands included, among other things, the removal of all American bases in the country, the reinstitution of those conservative clerics sacked by the government, the removal of the monarchy, and the reinstitution of Sharia law in the country. However, buried in this list were demands that some might consider more progressive--the institution of free and fair democratic elections, for example, or the release of all political prisoners. Almost worse than the attack, though, was the frailty it revealed in the Saudi security apparatus. Further intelligence reports over the next several days suggested considerable collaboration between the gunmen and the security personnel on site, including the smuggling of a considerable amount of materiel into the Mosque over the past several weeks. Officially, several of the gunmen were supposed to be in Saudi prison, though a quick inventory of the prisoners by Saudi intelligence quickly revealed that they had either never been properly processed (in essence, having been released by sympathetic prison guards and police), had been released due to recent budget cuts and overcrowding of prisons, or had otherwise managed to affect their “escape”--escapes that had never been properly registered with the government. Saudi intelligence wasn’t even able to identify what group these gunmen were aligned with: some suggested that they were Al Qaeda affiliates, but the prevailing opinion was that they were some offshoot organization of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Response When news finally reached him, Mohammad bin Salman was furious. Eager to prevent the situation from spiraling further out of control, he ordered a renewed assault on the Mosque on the evening of the 17th (the prohibition on violence within Mecca that had stalled the government’s response in 1979 hardly seemed to matter to him. Most Saudis were not surprised, considering few other Muslim traditions bothered him these days). Featuring highly-trained Saudi commandos, MbS hoped that by quickly dealing with the gunmen, he would be able to control the narrative and prevent the crisis from escalating out of control like the Grand Mosque Seizure of 1979 had. The attack failed. Surprised by the heavy armaments of the gunmen (who had managed to smuggle significant amounts of materiel into the facility over the previous weeks, owing to, intelligence suspects, collaborators inside of the Mosque’s security detail and inside the construction crew used in the recently ordered expansion of the Mosque), the assault failed when an RPG barrage was able to disable two of the four AH-6 Little Birds that were being used to infiltrate the compound. In all, the failed assault led to the capture of roughly a half dozen members of the 85th Special Forces Battalion as well as two dozen further casualties. The gunmen took a few dozen casualties of their own, but by far the greatest death toll was among the civilians in the Mosque. Some estimates put the number of civilian casualties upwards of one hundred. Whatever hopes MbS had of “controlling the situation” died with that raid. While state media was still deathly silent about the seizure--let alone the failed raid--their censorship was not enough. By noon the next day, practically everyone in Saudi Arabia knew of the events at the Grand Mosque. Details were inaccurate, sure, but in a way that made matters worse for the Saudi government. One viral tweet claimed that over three hundred civilians had died in the failed raid--a claim which quickly galvanized much of the populace against MbS. For many elements of Saudi society, the Mosque Seizure also served as a signal. All throughout the country, protests (which had never really gone away over the course of the past year, despite MbS’s best efforts to dispatch them) flared up once again. The intensity of these protests is hard to overstate. In Medina, after a day or two of protests, rioters were able to seize control of several government buildings within the city, defacing the many portraits of the King and Crown Prince in the building and leading to yet another siege scenario with Saudi security forces. With his control of the situation rapidly deteriorating, and with protesters in several cities posed to actually take control of those cities, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman resorted to the only option still available to him. He ordered the National Guard to fire upon the protesters. Out With the New For many in the Saudi establishment, MbS’s bungling of this situation was simply the final straw. His leadership over the past three years could be described as nothing short of an abject failure. In a few years time, he had managed to transform Saudi Arabia from one of the region’s most stable and prosperous countries into something that bordered on a failed state. His governance had led to the collapse of internal stability, the massive devaluation of ARAMCO (and the corresponding shrinkage of government revenues), and the utter humiliation of the Saudi military on the global stage in both Yemen and in the skies of Qatar. If Saudi Arabia was to have a single hope of survival, Mohammad bin Salman had to go. In the House of Saud, plans carefully crafted over the last several years were finally set into motion. The Saudi Arabian National Guard, having long been the country’s conservative bastion and the last line of defense against coups in Saudi Arabia, had been alienated by Mohammad bin Salman’s policy of rapid liberalization. Over the past year, conservative elements of the House of Saud, led by Mutaib bin Abdullah, were able to take advantage of this alienation to make major inroads with the National Guard. These attempts were greatly aided by Mutaib’s extensive connections within the Guard: Mutaib had previously served as the Commander of the National Guard from 2010 to 2013, and later as Minister of the National Guard from 2013 up until his arrest (and subsequent release) by Mohammad bin Salman in 2017. The son of King Abdullah (2005-2015), Mutaib has long been considered one of the vanguard of conservatism within the Saudi royal family--a standard which he has used to great effect to rally the recently disenfranchised conservative elements of Saudi society. On the night of 4/5 July 2023, Mutaib and his supporters finally launched their plan. Using tribal National Guard units brought into Riyadh to help suppress the protests, as well as elements of the Saudi military dissatisfied with the disastrous leadership of MbS, the plotters were able to seize control of Al Yamamah Palace, as well as other key locations throughout the city and the country. While the Royal Guard fought valiantly, they were ultimately unable to resist the overwhelming force of the plotters, in part owing to the existence of sympathetic elements within the Royal Guard itself. By the sunrise the following morning, Mohammad bin Salman was dead, and the aging, decrepit King Salman was in custody. In With the Old With the Crown Prince dead, there arose the immediate matter of resolving the succession of Saudi Arabia. King Salman (really, Prince Mutaib using King Salman) called an emergency meeting of the Allegiance Council to determine the new Crown Prince. While there was some token resistance to the prospect of naming Prince Mutaib as the chosen successor of King Salman, the simple fact of the matter was that no one really had the power to resist the fait accompli. There was no time to deliberate over who would ascend to the leadership of the country--by the time they could decide such a thing, the protesters would have toppled their government and the House of Saud would become just another historical footnote. Besides, Mutaib was promising to represent their interests--he promised the return of generous stipends for members of the Royal Family, as well as, most importantly, the stabilization of the country. Besides: he had men with guns, and they did not. By the end of the day, Prince Mutaib was declared Crown Prince Mutaib, the designated successor of King Salman. The Collapse Perhaps Mutaib’s coup came too late. Or perhaps his coup, coupled with the ongoing siege of the Grand Mosque and the fervent protests across the country, signaled that the Saudi state was at its absolute weakest. The specifics will be for historians to figure out. Whatever the case, the Saudi state as a unified entity proceeded to collapse over the next three weeks. With mounting pressure from the protests throughout the country, Mutaib was forced to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor, ordering National Guard and military units to fire upon protesters. Owing to the common cause between the protesters and many elements of the National Guard and Army, these orders were met with opposition by many units--especially among personnel hired as part of the recent recruitment drive. Very quickly, chains of command dissolved, with many units forced to default to the command of their company, battalion, or brigade commanders. In many cities throughout the country, this devolved into open combat between different parts of the same element, as some units attempted to defend the protesters while others cracked down on them. Through all of this chaos, conservative resistance to the House of Saud began to coalesce into one umbrella movement, the Council for Islamic Revival in the Arabian Peninsula (CIRAP). Composed of different protest groups, Sunni religious organizations, clerical associations, religious tribal militias, and, increasingly, military and national guard units, CIRAP has emerged as the outlet for just about all popular, conservative resistance to the House of Saud and the current government. Even several liberal opposition groups have fallen under CIRAP’s umbrella, hoping to unite with conservative, but still democratic elements in the movement to bring about democracy in the Arabian Peninsula. CIRAP’s support base is extremely heterogeneous (and therefore, relatively fragile). The closest thing the group has to leadership is the Revival Council, a group of clerics, military officers, and religious tribal leaders led by the former Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdulaziz al-Sheikh. The leadership of this organization is largely comprised of conservative Salafist and Wahhabist figures, though there are several more moderate Islamist groups with representation, most notably several groups affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The only thing they can seem to agree on is that the current government has to go, and for now, that seems to be enough. Over the course of July, CIRAP managed to oust the government from most of the Hejaz and some of the rural areas in the center of the country through a combination of military force (primarily, the defection of military, national guard, police, and militia groups) and civil unrest forcing the withdrawal of self-interested Saudi civilian leadership. Their popular legitimacy was cemented when Sheikh Abdulaziz managed to peacefully end the Grand Mosque Seizure, negotiating the release of the thousands of hostages and the surrender of the gunmen. With each passing day, CIRAP grew stronger--quickly becoming the greatest threat to the monarchy that Saudi society had ever faced. Do Not Go Gentle Into That Good Night The successes of CIRAP should not be taken to mean that the government of Saudi Arabia did nothing to combat them over the month of July. Simply put, there was little the government could do. With the normal chains of military command shattered following the coup, and similar upheaval up and down the structures of civilian governance as supporters of MbS and more liberally minded government officials were purged, the government simply lacked the cohesion necessary to respond to the CIRAP’s rise. Matters weren’t helped by the mess that Mohammad bin Salman left behind: even though Mutaib ordered ARAMCO to restore normal levels, production had dropped off so greatly due to fields closing as a result of the discounts that it would take several years for finances to return to normal. With the Saudi economy effectively in freefall and the country facing extreme turmoil, citizens across the country looked to convert their riyals to US dollars at the guaranteed government exchange rate of one riyal to 0.27 USD. After about two weeks of this, the country’s foreign reserves were running dangerously low, further worsening their financial woes. This led to further discontent in the police, military, and national guard, as well as among civilian officials, many of whom were only loyal due to their paycheck. Mutaib was also left with the unenviable task of dealing with the unprecedented social reforms MbS had made in just three short years. Hoping to steal away conservative support for the protests and reforge the alliance between the Ulema and the House of Saud, Mutaib almost immediately rolled back most of MbS’s reforms. Drugs were quickly recriminalized, churches were once again banned from the country, and the Shi’a Hawza in Dammam was shuddered. However, these changes did not have quite the effect Mutaib was hoping for. Over the past year, many conservative groups had come to believe that the House of Saud were munafiqun--nonbelievers only attempting to use Islam for profit. The fact that this belief had been spread by Iran did not seem to bother them much. The truth was the truth, regardless of its source. At the same time, these changes greatly alienated those same liberal youths the MbS had been trying to pull over. Liberal protests, like those seen during the Arab Spring, quickly flared up to match the fire of their conservative counterparts, demanding the creation of either a Constitutional Monarchy or a full republic, depending on which group of protesters you asked. After effectively securing his control over the still-loyal parts of the country and reorganizing the military to account for the vacancies created by the mass defections and the post-coup purge, Mutaib issued an ultimatum to CIRAP on 28 July 2023: lay down your arms and surrender to the authority of the monarchy, or be destroyed. CIRAP replied with a counter ultimatum: step down from the throne and allow for the creation of a provisional government to craft a new constitution, or be destroyed. Neither group backed down. These joint ultimatums expired on 30 July 2023. The Saudi Arabian Civil War had begun.
Fault Lines
Below is an overview of the major factions of the Saudi Arabian Civil War, as well as the primary portions of society from which they draw their support.
The Government of Saudi Arabia
While the government currently lacks the love of its people, it more than makes up for this with force of arms and vast financial resources. The Tribes While some of the more religious tribes in the north of the country have sided with CIRAP, the majority of tribal sheikhs and militias in Saudi Arabia have sided with the monarchy. The tribes have traditionally been very tied into the Saudi security establishment, and were a major force behind bringing Mutaib to power. Sheikhs are largely motivated by the fear of losing power rather than the promise of gaining power: many parts of CIRAP have advocated stripping the tribes of their special relationship with the state, making this civil war an existential threat to tribal power in Saudi Arabia as it now exists. Largely conservative, the tribes are cautious The House of Saud The House of Saud is much more than the house of the monarch. The royal family has some 15,000 members (though power is concentrated in a group of about 2,000), and all of them stand to lose a lot if CIRAP emerges victorious. What the House of Saud lacks in popular support, it more than makes up for through connections to global elites and unimaginable wealth.
The Council for Islamic Revival in the Arabian Peninsula
While CIRAP lacks the military might and wealth of the government, it far and away outpaces the government in terms of popular support. By and large, people are eager to support CIRAP, while popular support for the monarchy is often begrudging at best. CIRAP hopes to leverage this into victory. The Muslim Brotherhood While the Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood is very different from the Salafi/Wahhabi strain of Islam that is so dominant in Saudi Arabia and CIRAP, civil wars make for strange bedfellows. The Arabian Muslim Brotherhood (AMB) is quickly emerging as one of the more popular mass organizations under the CIRAP umbrella, tacking a little closer to the Salafi interpretation of Islam than its parent organization. AMB uses its considerable wealth and member base to organize social services and charity work for the inhabitants of CIRAP-controlled Saudi Arabia, including inter alia neighborhood watches, trash collection, and food distribution. Broadly speaking, AMB’s leadership hopes to install a Sharia-compliant democracy in Saudi Arabia. The Ulema Nominally led by the former Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdulaziz al-Sheikh, the vast majority of Saudi Arabia’s conservative clergy have thrown their weight behind the cause of CIRAP. The Ulema constitutes the brain of CIRAP, serving as the faction behind which all the other factions rally. While they are nowhere near as wealthy as they once were after being stripped of their power and assets by MbS, they still command the hearts and minds of millions of religious Saudis, particularly in the Hejaz and among the older, more conservative population.
Split Between the Two
The National Guard While the National Guard formed the backbone of Prince Mutaib’s coup, it is, at its heart, a deeply divided institution directly drawn from the most conservative parts of Saudi society, with recruits largely tied to either the Wahhabi religious establishment or the tribes. The Guard has broken more or less along these lines, with the regular brigades breaking roughly equally between the two factions, and the fowj (irregular poorly trained and poorly equipped tribal militias) largely siding with the monarchy. Historically viewed as one of the more incompetent branches of the Saudi Armed Forces, the National Guard has actually emerged as one of the more competent forces in the conflict. Exempted from the massive recruitment drive that has bloated the Army, the SANG was able to maintain unit cohesion and discipline. These days, commanders on both sides find themselves relying heavily on their Guard units both to maintain order and to engage in front-line conflict. The fowj are still a lackluster force. Equipped with surplus SANG equipment, the fowj exist outside of the traditional SANG command structure, meaning they are poorly disciplined. Still, they’re warm bodies with guns, and in a war like this, that might just be good enough. The Military Part of the reason the initial stages of the conflict have been so favorable to CIRAP is that the Saudi military establishment is, put simply, in total disarray. Saudi Arabia’s massive recruitment drive has caused the Armed Forces to struggle to maintain discipline and combat effectiveness, particularly in the Saudi Land Forces, which have almost doubled in size over the past eighteen months. Exacerbated by Saudi Arabia’s recent humiliations in both Yemen and Qatar, morale in the military is at an all-time low. Mass desertions were not uncommon in the early days of the conflict, and it is still fairly common for army units to flee, surrender, or disobey orders at the first sign of conflict. On paper, the majority of the military has sided with the monarchy, with maybe 70 percent of units remaining loyal. In reality, the division between the two is much more evenly split, with maybe 40 percent of personnel (mostly enlisted personnel, with very few officers) joining CIRAP, 30 percent personnel remaining loyal, and the remaining 30 percent having deserted, defected to AQAP or IS, or never having reported for duty in the first place. CIRAP is more popular among enlisted personnel (junior and senior) than among officers, leading the rebel group to be more bottom-heavy than is ideal, with a relatively sparse selection of experienced and trained leaders. However, the loyalist military is overly bottom-heavy as a result of the recruitment drive too, so this sort of washes out.
The Wildcards
The Liberals The liberal movement in Saudi Arabia finds itself stuck between a rock and a hard place. While some groups have joined forces with CIRAP in hopes that they can co-opt the organization’s calls for a provisional government/constitutional assembly to create a liberal democracy, most remain deeply dissatisfied with both the monarchy and CIRAP. Overwhelmingly young (mostly under 25), the liberals have borne the brunt of the economic crisis. Their meager savings have been entirely washed away, and youth unemployment has skyrocketed from 25 percent to almost 50 percent. Liberal protests are common in almost every major city, but are largest in Jeddah and Riyadh, where they threaten the stability of both CIRAP and the government, respectively. To both factions, liberals represent the last remaining untapped power of the conflict. The side that is able to better court them will likely enjoy a groundswell of enthusiastic, young supporters. Of course, this comes with its risks as well: the concessions made to win them over might just alienate other elements of the fragile coalitions keeping both sides afloat, leading them to collapse much like MbS before them. Anyone appealing to the liberals, then, will have to walk a fine line between victory and defeat. The Shi’a and the Popular Defense Forces While Mohammad bin Salman was perhaps kinder to the Shi’a than any Saudi monarch has been in the last century in his final years, that is not to say his reign was good to the Shi’a. In addition to the heavy repression that was the hallmark of his early rule, MbS’s reforms made the Shi’a communities of Saudi Arabia a scapegoat for most of the problems in Saudi society. While the security apparatus shifted from oppressing them to protecting them around 2022, it did a remarkably poor job of doing that in the face of mass unrest. With every step towards “tolerance” and every promotion of Shi’a rights, Shi’a communities found themselves targeted by a new wave of violence--violence that the largely conservative, largely Sunni police tended to drag their feet on preventing or investigating, regardless of their orders from Riyadh. With the fall of MbS, even that protection seems to have melted away now. Without any sort of state guarantee of security in these trying times, Shi’a communities have taken it upon themselves to provide their own security. In both Eastern Province, Najran, southern Asir, and Jizan, Shi’a communities have created a series of loosely affiliated armed self-defense groups. Collectively called the Popular Defense Forces, these militias haven’t actively stepped into the civil war, but remain an element to consider. For the government, they are both a blessing and a curse. The Eastern Province PDF groups provide security for communities in the region, allowing the government to focus more of its scarce resources on crushing CIRAP in the west. At the same time, there is the threat that the PDF might become too powerful or too bold in the future and might demand some sort of legal rights or recognition for the government--or worse, start some sort of armed conflict against them. While the Eastern Province PDF groups are more or less content to defend themselves from the odd terrorist attack or government attempt at repression for now, the PDF groups in Asir, Najran, and Jizan are stuck in a fight for their lives. Set upon by CIRAP from the north (whose leadership is decidedly anti-Shi’a) and Al Qaeda from the east, these PDF groups have no option but to fight for survival. Still, they are poorly armed (mostly with equipment stolen from army deserters) and poorly trained, making their survival unlikely without foreign assistance. Al Qaeda While Al Qaeda is by no means the most popular group in Saudi Arabia, its role in this conflict is critically important. After crossing the border into Saudi Arabia following the most recent phase of the war in Yemen, Al Qaeda was able to use stolen Saudi equipment, popular discontent, and infiltrators within the Saudi army to take control of the area near the Yemeni border, cutting of the remaining Saudi Armed Forces in Yemen. Al Qaeda’s fighters in Saudi Arabia are well trained, well equipped, and numerous (numbering somewhere in the tens of thousands). Islamic State Unlike in the 2010s, Islamic State does not really control territory in Saudi Arabia. However, it has a presence in the conflict all the same. After spreading some assets into Saudi Arabia over the past year, Islamic State is now engaged in a limited guerilla/insurgent warfare along the Iraqi-Saudi border, with some spillover violence into Iraq. If left unchecked, this might grow into something greater, but for now, it’s more of a concern and nuisance for units operating near the border than an existential threat to the stability of the state.
Egypt The former home of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s Islamists have once again found their cause emboldened by the war in Saudi Arabia. Traffic on the Saudi-Egyptian Causeway at Sharm El-Sheikh has been completely closed down, as the government fears that it may be used by the Muslim Brotherhood or other terrorist groups attempting to infiltrate Egypt. Fortunately, Egypt’s decision to denounce Saudi Arabia has somewhat placated the Islamist faction in Egypt. While protests are common in Egypt’s largest cities, they’re mainly calling for Egypt to announce its support for CIRAP rather than calling for the toppling of Egypt’s military dictatorship. Regardless, with the groundswell for Islamism in the Arab World, the dictatorship will have to tread carefully in the coming days, lest they experience a repeat of the Arab Spring. Iraq Iraq has seen a noted increase in Islamic State activity, with the organization hoping to take advantage of the chaos on the country’s southern border to strike out against the government and the KRG both. IS activity has increased somewhat in Anbar Province, as IS elements in central Iraq look to strike out across the border into the wildly destabilized Saudi Arabia. Some suspect that IS might even try to relocate into Saudi Arabia in order to take advantage of the chaos, if the situation continues to deteriorate. Yemen The Hadi Government is on death’s door. Its two major backers, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, have had their interventions more or less collapse over 2023. With the destruction of the UAE bases in Assab and Socotra, the UAE has lost most of its ability to project force into the theatre. Without air support or a staging area for supply shipments, those UAE ground assets deployed in the country have started to lose combat effectiveness, with ground commanders warning the upper echelons of command that they will be unable to continue their mission within a few weeks to a month. For the Saudi forces in the north of the country, the situation is even more dire. With Al Qaeda having seized control of the supply lines back in Saudi Arabia and CIRAP’s control of the Red Sea coastline, most of Saudi Arabia’s forward-deployed assets have been almost entirely cut off from their supply lines. The heavily damaged port of Al Hudaydah--the only port in the country’s north--has been unable to handle the necessary supply shipments, especially following a series of missile strikes from the Houthis. The Saudi Ground Forces, facing a serious discipline deficit following their mass recruitment drive, have almost completely collapsed. It is not uncommon for Saudi army units, short on basic supplies like ammo, food, and fuel, to be surrounded and either destroyed or forced to surrender. Desertion back across the border is common, as is reluctant defection to Al Qaeda in the north. Top brass in Saudi Arabia expects that, if they remain in the country, the Saudi Intervention will collapse by the end of October. A full withdrawal is recommended--especially since it will provide much-needed troops to the homefront. The UAE and Kuwait Inspired by the success of CIRAP (and in the UAE’s case, disheartened by the utter failure of the government’s attack on Qatar), Sunni Islamist opposition groups in the UAE and Qatar have become much more vocal, stepping up protest activities in major cities. Fortunately, they have so far been spared from much of the chaos in Saudi Arabia (since the fighting is concentrated on the other side of the country), but CIRAP still poses a significant threat to their continued existence. Bahrain With its main guarantor of stability in complete collapse, the government of Bahrain is in an extremely precarious situation. The general population, largely Shi’a, is still restless after the attack on the Hawza in Dammam and the death of Sheikh Qassim. Expecting Saudi forces in the country to withdraw soon to respond to the instability in their own country, Bahrain’s Shi’a population has engaged in mass demonstrations against the Sunni ruling family. Demands at this point are hardly unified, with some calling only for guarantees of religious freedom, while others call for the deposal of the monarchy and the institution of an Islamic Republic like that in Iran. So far, the two American bases in the country (some of the largest in the Gulf) have gone unharassed, outside some protests nearby, but the base guards have nevertheless been placed on high alert. The United States So far, none of America’s bases in the Gulf have come under attack. This is more timing than anything: though Saudi Arabia permitted America to build an unprecedented sixteen bases in the country, many of these were still under construction or in the planning phase at the beginning of the conflict. With American doctrine in the region mostly focused on countering Iran and guaranteeing security in the oil-rich Gulf, those bases were the first to be built, and the only ones to be finished before the outbreak of the war. In an attempt to quiet the conservative opposition centered in the Hejaz, Mutaib canceled the under-construction naval bases along the country’s west coast--a decision which did not come under too much scrutiny from the United States, since Camp Lemmonier in Djibouti was more stable and more than capable of handling US force requirements in the Red Sea. Since the Gulf areas have remained under the control of the government, the bases there have not come under any sort of attack, though they are the foci of near-constant protests against the “American occupation” of the country. The government is under considerable pressure to kick the American bases out of the country, but it remains to be seen whether they finally acquiesce to their demands or not: it might steal some of the wind out of CIRAP’s sails, but it might also make it harder to defeat them militarily.
The World
Oil Prices Saudi Arabia is the largest oil exporter in the world, exporting more than twice the next largest exporter (Russia). It stands to reason, then, that conflict in Saudi Arabia has been very bad for global energy prices. Oil prices have skyrocketed, leading to major economic slowdowns throughout the globe, but especially in net-importer countries like Southeast Asia, Western Europe, South Asia, and East Asia. The world, only just The rise in prices has been good for higher cost producers, though. Russian and Central Asian oil has become a hot commodity these days, as has North American shale, though higher energy prices have a large enough negative effect on the rest of the economy that growth has still slowed or receded. Iran, still struggling to boost oil exports in the face of American sanctions (which threaten to sanction any company that purchases Iranian oil), has not seen as large an increase as they would have without those sanctions. Even so, with oil prices as high as they are and supply as disrupted as it is, more and more companies, particularly in South and East Asia, have demonstrated a willingness to violate US sanctions and import Iranian oil. Still, there is a silver lining. In a rare example of cooperation, CIRAP and the government have agreed to an under-the-table profit sharing arrangement on oil transiting through the trans-peninsular pipeline to Yanbu (the country’s main oil export terminal for western-bound exports). In exchange for a cut of the revenues, CIRAP has agreed to not shut down the pipeline, which would all but destroy the oil export reliant Saudi economy. While this may seem overly kind of CIRAP, it's really a matter of self-preservation. Cutting off the pipeline would cause oil prices to skyrocket, causing instability in western markets that may help Global North countries justify intervention in the conflict in order to protect their financial interests. Likewise, it provides CIRAP with leverage to keep them out of the war--intervene, and we’ll cut the pipeline and kill your economy. The under-the-table revenues paid out by the government also provide the majority of CIRAP’s funding. In the event that the pipeline is finally closed, there will likely be a massive economic slowdown in European and American markets, with a corresponding increase in dependence on Russian oil. Asia will also be affected, but less directly: Asian oil doesn’t have to come through the pipeline, so the interruptions will be more price related rather than “this infrastructure just isn’t operating now” related. Natural Gas Prices Natural gas prices, funnily enough, have not been very heavily impacted. While Saudi Arabia has considerable natural gas resources, it is a net importer, so the conflict has not really disrupted the market for LNG too heavily.
November 2029 In 2026, the other Arab States of the Gulf committed to the construction of the Gulf Railway, a 2,000 plus kilometer rail project traveling up and down the Arabian Peninsula coast of the Persian Gulf. Construction on the project has gone swimmingly, with the southern extent of the project set to open in Q3 of next year--an important milestone in improving the interconnectedness of the Gulf States, and a critical development for the economic growth of the region. However, the southern stretch of the route is only part of the project. The original project was slated to travel through Saudi Arabia as well, where it would travel north along the coast towards Kuwait. When the project began in 2026, this stretch of the route was delayed indefinitely due to the massive instability in Saudi Arabia. With the country finally starting to stabilize, we are now hoping to move forward with the northern stretch of the Gulf Railway, which would connect Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to the other Arab Gulf States via a high speed passenger rail line and a freight line. The northern stretch of the Gulf Railway will actually consist of two lines, running separately before reconnecting north of Dammam. The first line--more or less the main line--will travel across a new bridge parallel to King Fahd Causeway between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Once arriving back on the mainland, the line will continue northbound through Dammam and Al Jubail, providing service to both before continuing north towards Kuwait City. Upon reaching Kuwait City, the high speed rail line will terminate. The cargo route will continue service northbound through the existing connection to Iraq’s rail network, which is capable of providing conventional passenger service and freight service. In total, this line will run about 440km. The good news is, most of this route is already funded, and a substantial amount of it has already been built. Saudi Arabia started construction on the route in 2020, with an expectation that the project would finish sometime in 2025. The start of the civil war in 2023 probably stopped construction, but hey, that’s still three years of construction we don’t have to do a second time! The second route will branch off from Al Hudaid in the UAE to enter Saudi Arabia. After entering the Kingdom, the route will continue through Salwa in Saudi Arabia along the coast towards Dammam, where it will join back up with the first route. This much shorter route, which bypasses Qatar and Bahrain (making the direct trip to Dammam shorter) is about 280km. Combined, these two projects are expected to cost a total of 14b USD. Construction is expected to be completed in 2032. In addition to providing a direct rail connection between Kuwait and the other states of the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf Railway will bring a host of other benefits to Kuwait. Traveling just a bit south from the Kuwaiti border to Ras Al Khair provides access to the rest of Saudi Arabia’s extensive rail network. From Ras Al Khair, trains can transfer to the North-South Railway Line, which provides service to the interior of Saudi Arabia. From there, the rail network provides service to Jordan, and with a few more transfers, riders and freight can make it to the Red Sea coast of Saudi Arabia or even Egypt without all that much hassle. For the first time, the Arabian Peninsula is truly connected. While not part of the Gulf Railway Project, the UAE has proposed another three rail projects to Saudi Arabia which will help build regional integration. The first is a [~270km conventional rail connection between Al Batha in the UAE and Haradh in Saudi Arabia. This line, costing just 1b USD, will significantly reduce the amount of time necessary for moving freight between the United Arab Emirates (and by extension, Jebel Ali and the Sultanate of Oman) and Riyadh, where said freight can transfer onto the Saudi Landbridge Project when it is completed. This land bridge is expected to become an important part of shipping in the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf: ships will be able to offload their cargo in either Jeddah (on the Red Sea) or on any Arabian Gulf port and have it shipped by train across the peninsula to load onto a different ship on the other side, shaving a little over a week off of the shipping time. Every ship offloaded this way is expected to save somewhere around roughly 100m USD in labor and fuel costs. The second new project is a high speed rail line branching off of the Gulf Railway. This route will branch off at Salwa and travel north to Al Hofuf. Once in the city, this line will join the Riyadh-Al Hofuf-Dammam line, providing service to Riyadh and Dammam (though in practice, mostly only Riyadh, since it’d be faster to get to Dammam through the regular Gulf Railway route).
[Conflict] Only we get to violently suppress protesters.
META: Trying this again. Let's see how far I get this time. With the news that the GCC plans to quash thedefinitely peaceful protests in Bahrain; China cannot just allow the GCC to do so as they did in, for instance, 2011. Not because of any complaints about human rights, mind you, but because, well, we're kind of entangled with the Shia now in this chaos for better or worse. Citing human rights concerns, China will, effective immediately, begin moving forces into position to block the movement of any foreign vessels into Bahrain and secure the causeway to Saudi Arabia. We will ask the Bahraini opposition [that we have been encouraging and supplying, and that, in 2011, called a similar intervention a foreign occupation, 'tantamount to a declaration of war', and asked for foreign aid] for permission to send a single armored brigade combat team into Bahrain to prevent GCC forces from suppressing these demonstrations. If we receive this invitation, we will immediately begin transporting forces into Bahrain from Qatar. These forces, should they arrive in Bahrain, will not act to eliminate the monarchy, but will both forcibly repel GCC forces, and also eliminate any remaining loyalists if the monarchy is eliminated [and by eliminated, we mean the monarch is killed or flees into exile]. Even if we do not receive permission from the opposition, Chinese forces have received orders to open fire [with best attempts made to minimize casualties and infrastructure damage] to prevent foreign forces from moving into Bahrain. Furthermore, we will block GCC forces from conducting their illegal blockade of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. PLAN forces in the region will be ordered to guard Chinese, Iranian, and Qatari freight traffic ala the Tanker Wars. If any force attempts to accost these vessels for spurious 'inspections' they will be destroyed with excessive and disproportionate force. In addition, our naval vessels and aircraft will harass the ones that the GCC is using in their anti-smuggling operations, performing maneuvers at extremely close, even reckless distances, shadowing ships and aircraft, and target-locking GCC aircraft. Chinese aircraft will make extremely low passes over GCC vessels. [S] In addition, we will use our ISR capabilities, both naval and air-based, to tip off smugglers, observe patterns, and direct smugglers to the most optimal routes. [\S] It is hoped that these operations will render the anti-smuggling effort impotent to achieve its goals.
Forces Deployed
1 armored brigade combat team from Qatar to Bahrain
Qatar:
Name
Type
Number
KJ-2000
AWACS
3
Il-76
Strategic Airlifter
12
Il-78
Aerial refueling tanker
3
Su-30MKK
Air superiority
76
Chengdu Cloud Shadow
ISStrike/Stealth
3
Indian Ocean Fleet:
Name
Type
Quantity
Type 002
Carrier
1
Type 052C
Destroyer
6
Type 054A
Frigate
6
Type 093
SSN
6
J-31
Carrier aircraft
32 [4 E-31 variants]
Z-18
Medium helicopter
10
Z-9
Utility helicopter
20
J-7
Interceptor
12
Q-7
Attack/Strike
12
H-6Z
Bomber
30
Y-8
Transport/Patrol
30
Finally, China will work the media over, keeping domestic and international audiences happy. To domestic and developing-world audiences, we will suggest that the GCC is acting on behalf of Western Imperialists, that we're acting in favor of national sovereignty and of ideological communism/socialism, and that we are also acting in China's [and, by extension, the world's] own interest by keeping our economy safe from the threats of the Gulf, both in oil and in maritime trade. State-owned outlets will blatantly call the GCC forces pirates, terrorists, and a threat to the general peace of the world. To foreign rich-world audiences in America and Europe, we will spin this as China being committed to human rights, 'peaceful' protest, and minority rights. We will also accuse GCC forces of everything from disappearing protesters to blocking food shipments to the Shia minority in Saudi Arabia. We will also, again, suggest that China is the one who is supporting free trade and general peace, and that the GCC is needlessly destabilizing the situation. In addition, to ensure that nobody gets up on us too much about being hypocritical, the party has chosen a couple of local officials who are legitimately corrupt and incompetent, and plans to organize protests against them to showcase to the world that China does allow protests [if they start getting off-message, though, they will be quashed, but most likely the officials will be removed before this is a problem]. In addition, we will invest some time and money in promoting our more harmless ethnic minorities in Yunnan Province, inviting foreigners to visit and consume culture-tourism products, and also producing documentaries on, for instance, the Mosuo, and their fascinating [and salacious] 'walking marriage' system. This will hopefully at least somewhat abate the accusations of hypocrisy. We'll also, of course, cite historical partnerships between the communists and minorities, and their privileged status, and claim that life is 'better as a minority in China than as a Han!" or somesuch.
February 2025 In its forty some years of existence, the Gulf Cooperation Council has become many things: a free trade area, a visa-free regime, a proposed currency union. But all of those things are window dressing over the GCC’s true founding purpose: the perpetuation of the rule of the Sunni monarchs of the Arabian Peninsula. With Saudi Arabia’s collapse into civil war and the eruption of wide-scale civil unrest in the island kingdom of Bahrain, this purpose is more important now than it has ever been before--for the collapse of one of the monarchies to Islamists or Liberals will likely create a domino effect that will lead to the collapse of all of them. The United Arab Emirates, both in support of its allies and in an effort to protect its own interests, has gone to the GCC to secure Peninsula Shield Force units to help guarantee stability in Bahrain and the Shi’a Provinces of Saudi Arabia. It is our hope that by acting proactively here rather than reactively, we can dramatically increase regional stability and protect ourselves from the spillover effects of the unrest in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Bahrain Though Saudi Arabia has managed to strip the title of “least stable GCC member state” from the longstanding titleholder Bahrain, this is due to Saudi Arabia’s instability rather than some great increase in Bahrain’s stability. Much like in the 1990s Uprising and in the 2011 Uprising accompanying the Arab Spring, it falls to the other members of the GCC to help ensure the stability of their smallest member. After securing an invitation for intervention from Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa and the government of Bahrain, Emirati, Jordanian, and Kuwaiti police, as well as small contingents from their armies under the aegis of Peninsula Shield Force, will arrive in the country via the Saudi-Bahrain Causeway, the port of Manama, and Bahrain International Airport. Officially, these forces will be deployed to protect the country’s vital infrastructure from damage, while the Bahraini security apparatus will be responsible for controlling and countering the protesters. In truth, the foreign forces deployed in Bahrain will be actively involved in the suppression of the protests and the maintenance of the Al Khalifa family’s rule over the country. The United Arab Emirates will counsel the government of Bahrain to declare a State of Emergency and order the protesters to disperse. While we suspect that this will not break up the protesters, it will provide a justification for future repressive measures. Once the State of Emergency is declared, Bahraini police, supported by the GCC allies, will work to clear protesters from key areas of the city to guarantee the security of important areas and prevent the protesters from being able to fully disrupt Bahrain’s economy. We currently expect the protesters to be non-violent, and will therefore use (mostly) non-lethal methods of repression, including tear gas, pepper spray, rubber bullets, and water cannons. Police will work to herd groups of protesters into situations where they can be split up and surrounded by the police, where arrests can then be made. Bahraini nationals will be detained (and, if possible, prosecuted for any criminal activities they engaged in), while foreign nationals will have their visas revoked and be deported to their country of origin. While we expect the protests to remain mostly nonviolent, the potential of violence cannot be entirely discounted. Therefore, counter-terrorism and military forces will be held in reserve to deal with the possibility of armed rebels. These groups will be given top priority in repressive efforts, with every effort made to pinpoint their leadership and safehouses, arrest their leaders, destroy their arms caches, and identify any foreign assistance they might be receiving. [S] Torture is authorized to assist in rooting out these violent groups. [/S] One critical part of the GCC intervention in Bahrain is to prevent the spread of information both through the protest movement and through the world at large. In problem areas, the Bahraini government will shut off the internet to prevent videos of police activities from leaking out, and will cut cell service to prevent protesters from being able to communicate among themselves, with mobile phone jammers being used to further restrict the flow of information. Even in areas where the internet is accessible, sites that are being used to organize the protests will be blocked by Batelco, the sole ISP in the country. The Information Affairs Authority, the Bahraini Ministry of Information, will work in close coordination with their GCC counterparts to censor any and all media that portrays the crackdown on the protests in a negative light. Al Jazeera and its affiliates, which have been banned in Bahrain since the 2010s, will remain banned. Problematic foreign reporters will be detained, stripped of their electronics, held in custody for 48 hours, and deported. Meanwhile, GCC-controlled media outlets including Al Arabiya, the second-largest news network in the Arab world, will do everything in their power to cast the protests in a negative light. Instances of violence or looting by the dissidents will be highlighted, while incidents of police violence (when they do manage to leak out of the information blockade in Bahrain) will be heavily downplayed or framed as “necessary” given the “connections of some of the dissidents to foreign terrorists.” The role of Iran in sponsoring the protests--whether they are doing so or not--will be highlighted when possible, with constant reminders that Iran was proven to be behind similar protests in Saudi Arabia. These media outlets will also heavily emphasize the role these protesters are playing in weakening the country for future foreign intervention, highlighting the fact that China has been actively seeking to invade countries in the region, from promoting intervention in Chinese state media (ignoring, of course, the fact that their intervention was allegedly to protect the Shi’a), to their UNSC Resolution attempting to justify intervention in Saudi Arabia’s Civil War, to their massive military deployments in the region and leaks that they intend to invade Saudi Arabia. The dissidents will be portrayed as a Fifth Column, weakening the state in preparation for a foreign invasion with imperialist designs
Name
Type
Number
Contributing Nation
Kuwaiti Police
Riot Police w/ Transports
300
Kuwait
Jordanian Police
Riot Police w/ Transports
300
Jordan
Omani Police
Riot Police w/ Transports
100
Oman
Dubai Police
Riot Police
400
Dubai
Abu Dhabi Police
Riot Police
300
Abu Dhabi
Sharjah Police
Riot Police
300
Sharjah
Nimr
MRAP
320
United Arab Emirates
Mirage 2000-RAD
Reconnaissance Aircraft
2
United Arab Emirates
Global 6000 “Project Dolphin”
SIGINT/Surveillance
1
United Arab Emirates
ECH-130H Compass Call Baseline-2
Electronic Warfare
2
United Arab Emirates
Presidential Guard Soldiers
Special Forces/Counterterrorism
350
United Arab Emirates
Regular Army Soldiers
Regular Soldiers
500
United Arab Emirates
UH-60L Black Hawk
Transport Helicopter
4
United Arab Emirates
BTR-3U Guardian
APC (Wheeled)
10
United Arab Emirates
EE-11 Urutu
APC (Wheeled)
10
United Arab Emirates
Saudi Arabia The far greater threat to regional stability is Saudi Arabia. While we are obviously concerned about the rise of CIRAP and Al Qaeda in western Saudi Arabia, we are far more concerned about the threat that hasn’t fully emerged yet: the Popular Defense Forces of Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. With a population of about 5 million, Eastern Province is home to a sizable Shi’a majority of about 1.65 million--or 33 percent of the Province’s population. Though this population is small on paper, it is of immense geopolitical importance, as it is heavily concentrated in the area surroundingQatif, Dammam, Hofuf, and the Al-Ahsa Oasis. This, of course, also happens to be the location of most of Saudi Arabia’s vast oil and natural gas resources. Given the importance of oil revenues to the continued existence of the Saudi government, the PDF groups of Eastern Province has the potential to become a massive thorn in the side of the Saudi Arabian government. So far, the groups are only loosely affiliated, lacking any sort of centralized leadership structure that is able to motivate the lightly-armed, poorly trained militia groups to leave their neighborhoods, let alone engage in armed offensives or guerilla activity against the government. But with China openly broadcasting its intentions to intervene in the province in its state media and the UNSC and through its massive deployments in Qatar and leaked diplomatic talks, we believe that it is safe to assume that these groups will not remain disorganized and passive forever. It is only a matter of time until some hostile actor in the region--be it Iran, China, Qatar, or Hezbollah--works to arm and organize the PDF into an effective fighting force capable of, at best, putting pressure on the Saudi rearguard and drawing forces from the front or, at worst, seizing and holding critical territory from the government. Therefore, it falls to us to ensure that this does not happen. At the invitation of the Saudi Arabian government, the UAE and the GCC will begin a deployment into Eastern Province to assist in peacekeeping in the region and free up Saudi Army and National Guard regiments for transfer to the Western Front. Unlike in Bahrain, where the Shi’a population is already out in the streets and protesting, the PDF is more of a future threat than an active threat. Peninsula Shield Force deployments in the region will be crafted accordingly: this is more of a counter-insurgency deployment than a “break up the protests in the streets” deployment (though there will be some of that, too, given the ongoing liberal protests in major cities). Police presence in Eastern Province will be concentrated around key points of infrastructure--oil refineries, pumping stations, pipelines, etc--in order to prevent them from coming under attack by terrorists or militant PDF groups. While this police presence will serve as the primary stabilizing force of the intervention, there will be three other critical components to ensuring the PDF to not rise up against the government. The first plank of the GCC policy will involve active policing of troublesome neighborhoods. At their core, the PDF exist to protect their neighborhoods from the threat of attacks from Sunni Islamists. If we can provide that security instead, then we should hopefully see PDF recruitment numbers drop. It is much easier to convince a man to pick up a gun and defend his neighborhood when an Al Qaeda suicide bomber kills his family than it is to do so when his family is safe and fed. To help provide this security, the police presence in Eastern Province will be increased significantly through reinforcements from the other GCC states. [S] The second plank involves heavy surveillance throughout Eastern Province. Using the increased police presence, thousands of CCTV cameras will be set up throughout the cities of Eastern Province, with the goal of ensuring that just about every street corner is covered from several different angles. Using this CCTV network, we hope to purchase and run facial recognition software (like that used during the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests) from the United States in order to track the movement of Eastern Province’s population. This will be used as part of a “prevent defense” strategy, in which PDF members, liberal protesters, and Sunni Islamists alike are identified and tracked throughout the Province, with the information collected being used to synthesize profiles on the dissidents and track connections between different groups. Shi’a mosques in the area will be subjected to particularly heavy surveillance. The third plank involves a more typical counter-insurgency operation. GCC and Saudi intelligence, with assistance from their western counterparts, will work to coverly identify major safehouses and weapons caches used by dissidents, including Sunni Islamists, liberals, and the PDF. Attempts will also be made to identify more “militant” groups among the liberals and the PDF--that is, groups that are more willing to engage in violence against the government than average. As these groups and locations are identified, a combination of special police units (or, in the case of very high value targets, special army units) will be deployed to arrest leaders and members, destroy caches and strongholds, and otherwise disable or disrupt the ability of these groups to provide effective resistance. Currently, the Eastern Province PDF are fragmented and without any sort of centralized leadership. This must remain the case. An organized PDF leadership is much more capable of persuading different groups to launch coordinated attacks on targets outside of their particular neighborhoods and turning the PDF. Working in close coordination with Saudi Arabia’s intelligence agencies, the intelligence agencies of the GCC (and, we hope, with the CIA, MI6, and other western intelligence agencies) will launch an extensive surveillance campaign on the Shi’a in Eastern Province, with the goal of identifying any sort of organized leadership structure uniting the militias before it has the chance to take route. Should we stumble across anything of this sort, we will ensure that the structure is broken up before it can cement itself, either by arresting key figures in the movement on trumped up charges, exploiting HUMINT vulnerabilities to sabotage the negotiations (say, by leaking fake intelligence that one of the leaders in question is actually a Saudi intelligence asset), or, if we catch on too late and meetings are already occurring, by raiding their meeting place and arresting the leadership in one fell swoop. [/S] Saudi and GCC state media will also undertake an extensive propaganda campaign to paint the new government in a more positive light in the Shi’a community. This media blitz, aided by American consultants, will focus on how a government victory is a favorable alternative for the Shi’a of Eastern Province. While the previous governments of Saudi Arabia might have oppressed the Shi’a, this was in large part due to the overwhelming presence of conservative Islamists in the government. Now that most of these people were forced out of the government by the late Mohammed bin Salman, the new government is much more amenable to guaranteeing certain rights to the Shi’a community. Since the alternative to the current government is a CIRAP, an umbrella group of hardcore Sunni Islamists that has allied with Al Qaeda, a group that has actively and consistently targeted Shi’a Muslims throughout its existence, it should be pretty easy to convince the Shi’a of Eastern Province that the devil you know (the government) is much better than the devil you don’t (Islamists that are allied with Al Qaeda). Extensive coverage will also be given to the efforts of GCC and Saudi police to protect Shi’a neighborhoods from Sunni Islamist attacks (which is a definitive change from the Saudi Arabia of old). [S] News of the ongoing suppression in Bahrain will, of course, be heavily censored. [/S] Police/Counter-insurgency Deployment
Name
Type
Number
Contributing Nation
Kuwaiti Police
Police w/ Transports
1200
Kuwait
Jordanian Police
Police w/ Transports
1500
Jordan
Omani Police
Police w/ Transports
1200
Oman
Dubai Police
Riot Police
750
Dubai
Abu Dhabi Police
Police
600
Abu Dhabi
Sharjah Police
Police
400
Sharjah
Fujairah Police
Police
300
Fujairah
Ajman Police
Police
100
Ajman
Ras Al Khaimah Police
Police
100
Ras Al Khaiamh
Umm Al Quwain Police
Police
20
Umm Al Quwain
Nimr
MRAP
500
United Arab Emirates
Presidential Guard Soldiers
Special Forces/Counterterrorism
800
United Arab Emirates
Regular Army Soldiers
Regular Soldiers
1500
United Arab Emirates
UH-60L Black Hawk
Transport Helicopter
10
United Arab Emirates
BTR-3U Guardian
APC (Wheeled)
20
United Arab Emirates
EE-11 Urutu
APC (Wheeled)
20
United Arab Emirates
Emergency Reserve Deployment This is a forward deployment to help deal with shit if it gets very bad (TM), like an open conflict or the PDF or Bahraini rebels actively seizing territory.
Name
Type
Number
Contributing Nation
Regular Army Soldiers
Regular Soldiers
4000
United Arab Emirates
Presidential Guard Soldiers
Special Forces
500
United Arab Emirates
Leclerc Tropic
MBT
60
United Arab Emirates
BMP-3
IFV
200
United Arab Emirates
UH-60L Black Hawk
Transport Helo
15
Rabdan 8x8
APC (Wheeled)
200
United Arab Emirates
Nimr
MRAP
300
United Arab Emirates
F-16E Block 60
Multirole
12
United Arab Emirates
AH-64E
Attack Helicopter
12
United Arab Emirates
Foreign Interference It would be naive of us to think that outside forces won’t try to provide any support to these groups to help further destabilize the region. Of particular note are China (for reasons discussed earlier), Iran (due to their extensive historical efforts to destabilize the GCC and their self-image as the leaders of the Shi’a faith), Pakistan (due to their increasing alignment with Iran and China), and Qatar (as revenge for Saudi Arabia’s coup attempt). Materiel support to dissident forces in the region can arrive through one of two ways. The first is by land. While ending the Qatar blockade was necessary to extract commitments from Qatar that they would not allow China to use Qatar as a base for an invasion into Saudi Arabia, it does come with downsides: namely, the end of the blockade means that the border between the two has opened up again, meaning that there is a chance that land traffic could be used to smuggle weapons and other assistance to the PDF groups in Eastern Province. Fortunately for us, the border with Qatar is short--only about 83 kilometers in total--and overwhelmingly desert. Traffic between Qatar and the GCC is funneled between two border crossings: the first with Saudi Arabia near Salwa and Abu Samra, and the second with the UAE near Al Hudaid (previously part of the Saudi-Qatar border until the recent border renegotiation between the UAE and Saudi Arabia). Doubly fortunate, the suspension of Qatar’s membership in the GCC means that the freedom of movement agreement between the GCC and Qatar is currently not in effect, allowing us to mandate whatever restrictions on border crossings that we see fit. Effective immediately, all vehicle traffic between Qatar and the GCC will be subjected to a full search. Utilizing state-of-the-art technology provided by the United States, all vehicles will be scanned (both physically and through the use of technology) for hidden smuggling compartments and screened with dogs trained to smell explosives and gunpowder. This should hopefully allow us to significantly reduce, if not entirely eliminate, arms smuggling occurring across the border. Since there is very little trade between Qatar and the GCC states it borders (in 2015, the last year before the blockade, Qatar only exported 1.67b USD to the UAE and 828m USD to Saudi Arabia, and only a fraction of that trade would be by land), we expect most traffic to be civilians in personal vehicles which is much easier for us to search. Still, shipping containers will come under special scrutiny, with their contents being electronically scanned, their shipping manifests being scanned for any irregularities, and a random sampling of their goods being physically opened and examined at the border crossing. We will also increase the number of patrols guarding the open desert. An increased UAE police presence will be used to double the frequency of patrols along the border road, while the border will be covered by constant UAV or helicopter overflights to identify smugglers or other persons attempting to cross illegally. The second way for foreign groups to smuggle in materiel is by sea. While Bahrain’s coastline is relatively short--just 161km (including outlying, sparsely populated islands), Saudi Arabia’s Persian Gulf shoreline is considerably longer, at about 650km, necessitating a significant commitment of resources to protect from smugglers. Luckily for us, the waters of the Persian Gulf are some of the most heavily patrolled in the world. Between the navies and coast guards of the GCC member states, Combined Task Force 152, and the United States Coast Guard deployment in Bahrain, the Persian Gulf has more patrol craft per square mile than just about any other waterway in the world. We will make extensive use of these patrol craft to ensure that materiel cannot be smuggled by boat to the PDF or the protesters in Bahrain. To this end, we will make a deployment of UAE and Kuwaiti coast guard and naval vessels to the area around Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, as was done during the 2011 Uprising in Bahrain, to help secure the integrity of their territorial waters (and to a lesser extent, EEZ). The US, with its massive naval presence in the region, will also be asked to provide assistance in this endeavor. Obviously, the quickest way to move large quantities of weapons into a country is through established ports, so we will focus some of our efforts on preventing weapons from being smuggled in through the port of Manama and through the major ports of Saudi Arabia. Shipments on vessels bearing the Chinese, Qatari, or Iranian flag will be placed under greater scrutiny, as will vessels that passed through their territorial waters or made stopovers at their ports before reaching the GCC.
[Expansion] Gulf Cooperation Council Road Infrastructure Expansion
July 2026 One stated function of the Gulf Cooperation Council has been to improve economic connections between its member states. Over the past two decades, several infrastructure projects have been proposed that would help bolster this economic interconnectivity. However, due to falling oil prices in the 2010s after the global financial crisis, many of these projects have been sitting in limbo. Now that oil prices have risen back up again in response to the instability in Western Saudi Arabia, the GCC member states are hoping to launch several new infrastructure projects to improve regional connectivity. Oman The opening of the Al Batinah Expressway, a major 8-lane highway connecting the capital city of Muscat to the United Arab Emirates via the border city of Kalba, in 2018 has proven to be a major boon to the economy of Oman’s Gulf of Oman coastline, which comprises a majority of the country’s population and most of its GDP. However, existing infrastructure projects are insufficient to meet transportation demand for the interior of the country, stalling the development of planned cities like Duqm and Salalah in the country’s southern governorates. Additionally, the Al Batinah Expressway is inadequately connected to the southern portion of the UAE (Al Ain, Abu Dhabi), which has stalled commerce with the major industrial centers in that area. In order to correct this, Oman will order the expansion of several major roads within the country, intended to ease the flow of commerce to the other GCC countries (through improved connections to the UAE and Saudi Arabia) and the north-south flow of commerce within the country.
Roadway
Previous Width
New Width
Length of Project
Completion Date
Route 31 (Green)
2-lane
4-lane
~950km
2031
Route 37 (Orange)
2-lane
4-lane
~170km
2029
Route 7 (Pink)
4-lane
6-lane
~80km
2028
Route 21 (Red)
Partially 4-lane, Partially 2-lane
Fully 4-lane
120km
2030
Unnumbered Route (Purple)
2-lane
4-lane
~260km
2030
Unnumbered Route (Brown)
2-lane
4-lane
~180km
2030
The United Arab Emirates According to the World Economic Forum’s 2019 Global Competitiveness Report, the UAE has some of the best road infrastructure not just in the region, but in the whole world, coming in at 7th in quality of roads and 12th in infrastructure. Still, there is always room for improvement, and there are several areas in which the UAE’s road infrastructure is still deficient. One such area is at the UAE-Oman border at the Kalba crossing, where the Al Batinah Expressway is forced to condense from eight lanes down to six on E99, which is then funneled directly through downtown Kalba and Fujairah, two fast-growing cities. As these cities continue to grow, congestion on E99 has continued to increase, necessitating a bypass of Kalba and Fujairah. The proposed bypass would simply expand existing roads, branching off of E99 to E102 to circumvent Kalba and Fujairah through Al Hayl (a smaller industrial region with little commuter traffic). There, it will reconnect to E84 and E89, where it can continue to Musandam and the northern emirates. This 12km project will expand the existing two-lane road to four-lanes and be completed by 2028. The other problem area is not really Emirati infrastructure, but rather, Saudi infrastructure that has been acquired by the Emiratis following the 2024 border negotiations. Specifically, the region around Shubaytah and Shaybah and the region leading up to Qatar. In the Shubaytah/Shaybah region, there are no effective border crossings between the once-Saudi controlled sector and the previous Emirati sector. Fortunately, this can be fixed with less than five kilometers of road. Easy peasy. Done by the end of the year. The other problem area is the road connecting Al Guwhait/Al Batha to Qatar (previously Saudi Route 5). Here, the road, despite carrying a substantial amount of Saudi-UAE and Qatar-UAE commerce, is only four-lanes in the section past Saudi-Emirati border (despite being six lanes in the UAE). The UAE has announced that it will expand this portion of the road to six lanes, a ~70km project to be completed by 2028. Qatar As the GCC attempts to repair ties with Qatar, the importance of improved infrastructure links between Qatar and the GCC has been highlighted. Owing to its status as a peninsula, the country only directly borders two other GCC members: Saudi Arabia and, following the border renegotiation of 2024, the United Arab Emirates. Infrastructure between Saudi Arabia and Qatar is wholly sufficient for the amount of commerce that flows between the two countries. Salwa Road, the corridor connecting Doha to Salwa in Saudi Arabia, is an eight-lane divided highway for its entire length. However, the other major thoroughfare heading south through the peninsula, the Qatar-UAE Road, is significantly less well-developed, measuring only four-lanes for its length. Matching the development happening on the UAE section of the Qatar-UAE Road, Qatar will expand this section from four lanes to six, allowing for increased vehicle traffic between Doha and Abu Dhabi. The other major proposed infrastructure plans to expand Qatar’s connection not to either of its neighbors, but to the island kingdom of Bahrain. The Qatar-Bahrain Causeway, first proposed in 2008, has been stuck in development hell ever since, first due to the 2008-2009 financial collapse (and correspondingly oil price decreases) and later due to the Qatar Diplomatic Crisis in 2017. Measuring 40km, the Causeway will depart Qatar just south of the city of Zubarah and arrive just north of the city of Askar in Bahrain. This bridge will have two major benefits. First, it will cut the 350km trip from Doha to Manama almost in half--down to about 160km, while also reducing land travel times to other major cities on the northern edge of the Gulf like Dammam, Al Jubail and Kuwait City. Second, the bridge will be capable of handling rail traffic as well, turning Doha in a major logistics hub for the future Gulf Railway, should the project ever move out of the planning phase. The bridge will cost about 5b USD, to be completed in Q2 2030. The bridge will be raised in certain sections to allow for the passage of maritime traffic. Bahrain The construction of the new Qatar-Bahrain Causeway will introduce new traffic patterns that were previously mostly unused on the island. Currently, most traffic in the island is set up to travel east-west, from the capital of Manama in the east to the King Fahd Causeway on the island’s western shore. With the introduction of the Qatar-Bahrain Causeway, the island’s ability to handle north-south traffic--especially traffic between the Qatar-Bahrain Causeway and the King Fahd Causeway--will have to be significantly expanded, with the goal of utilizing routes south of Manama that are not as important to current east-west traffic patterns. To this end, Bahrain has identified two major construction projects, both of which will expand existing highways on the small island nation. The first project will expand Alriffa Avenue (Route 90) from six lanes to eight, coupled with completing the expansion of King Hamad Highway (Route 94) from six lanes to eight. The second project will be intended as the primary bypass for bridge-to-bridge traffic. Using the relative under-development of the south of the island for most of the bypass, Bahrain will build a new six-lane highway in the place of Avenue 49, looping around the Zellaq Highway to Route 106 before breaking off through the rural neighborhood of Al Jasra before reaching King Fahd Causeway. Obviously, not all of the traffic increase will stay on these routes, so there needs to be some improvement of the east-west roadworks as well. Route 80 (Shaikh Isa Bin Salman Highway) is only eight lanes for part of its route, despite being the main east-west thoroughfare of the island. Bahrain will expand the route so the entirety is eight lanes. Kuwait Kuwait is separated from the remainder of the road improvements by Saudi Arabia, but the country is still in need of some improvements to its road infrastructure in order to improve connection with its allies in the GCC. While Kuwait’s internal road infrastructure is more or less satisfactory for domestic traffic, its external road connections severely limit the amount of commerce that can pass from the country to its neighbors. Given Iraq’s limited port capacity and instability, Kuwait City has the opportunity to become an important logistics hub for trade into Iraq if it can improve the road infrastructure connecting to it. In the south, Route 40 (connecting Kuwait City to Khaji in Saudi Arabia) will be expanded from four lanes to six lanes, while the bypass routes around the major population centers of Kuwait City and Al Jahra, Seventh Ring Road (Route 7) and Jassem Mohammad Al-Kharafi Road (Route 6) will be expanded from six lanes to eight lanes. The more important infrastructure improvements, though, come in the north, where they will improve the connection between Kuwait and Iraq. The four lane Shaikh Jaber Al Ahmad Al Sabad Road (Route 80) will be expanded from four lanes to six, while Saad Al Abdulla Al Sabah Road (Route 801) will be expanded as well. South of Sabah Al-Ahmad Natural Reserve (red), the road will be expanded from four lanes to six, while in the north section leading to Um Qasr (blue), the road will be expanded from a two lane, non-divided highway to a four-lane divided highway.
The causeway was inaugurated in 1986 and has since been vital for movement between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, two members of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council. The King Fahd Causeway was closed on March 7 as part of the precautionary measures implemented by Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabia’s embassy in Bahrain today announced that its citizens can return to the Kingdom via the King Fahd Causeway without prior permission. The reopening of the causeway comes as Bahrain and Saudi ease Covid-19 restrictions. Amid rumours that the causeway is shutting down for visitors from both countries, King Fahad Causeway Authority has announced that the passengers’ movement and finalization of travel procedures via King Fahad Causeway in both directions (the Kingdom of Bahrain-the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) are taking place in a normal way. July 23, 2020 at 1:52 pm The King Fahd Causeway linking Saudi and Bahrain will gradually reopen. The road was closed in March to curb the spread of COVID-19 and as both countries ease restrictions, it was announced the road would now reopen and Saudis who are currently in Bahrain may re-enter the kingdom without a permit. Bahrain has reopened the King Fahd Causeway bridge linking the island Kingdom with Saudi Arabia for truck drivers after months of closures due to the COVID-19 pandemic, according to officials. Read: Bahrain’s King Fahd Causeway set to open new gates on the Saudi side Bahrain’s King Fahd Causeway has completed a renovation project which will see the bridge’s passenger capacity increase by... Bahrain: King Fahad Causeway Reopening Rumours Denied. Bahrain; Bahrain: King Fahad Causeway Reopening Rumours Denied. June 9, 2020. Share on Facebook. Tweet on Twitter. tweet - Advertisement - “The King Fahad Causeway reopening will not be reopened tomorrow (June 10th) as rumored on social media,” announced the King Fahad Causeway Authority (KFCA) yesterday. The announcement came as the
Q8 BMW Club - Kuwait to Bahrain via Causeway - Causeway Video 2 of 2 - Bahrain side. #LIGOLIGO #SPONSOR #EDWARDCASTILLO. This video is unavailable. Watch Queue Queue The Kingdom of Bahrain—a name that translates as "Two Seas"—is actually an archipelago of 33 low-lying islands located in the heart of the Gulf. Situated along traditional Arabian and ... Saudi - Bahrain Causeway Live Feed. Sign in to like videos, comment, and subscribe. This feature is not available right now. Please try again later. Published on Aug 22, 2016. The other side of causeway. Skip to 2:00 for Saudi Causeway Tower Island One of the most expensive ... whatsapp status. The new Belleair Beach Causeway Bridge is open and its time to celebrate. Connecting the Pinellas County mainland with the outlying barrier islands, the brid... This feature is not available right now. Please try again later. Published on Oct 31, 2016. Manama City, Bahrain Tour . Source videos View attributions; Show more Show less. Loading ... This film about the King Fahad Causeway that connects Saudi Arabia With Bahrain. Directed by WafiAalghanim and produced by Al nijoom media production. Causeway Cove Marina Opens January 23, 2018 ... This feature is not available right now. Please try again later. Published on Jan 24, 2018. Causeway Cove Marina is the newest Fort Pierce marina ...
